Texas declaratory judgment standing

A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to
the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the
declaration sought. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (“A declaratory
judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties
and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought.”).

The scope of the UDJA includes,
A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise
may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute,
ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2008).

UDJA = UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT (DJA) (Texas)

Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. That Act is a remedial statute designed “to settle and to afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.002(b). It provides: “A person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. § 37.004(a). The Act,
however, does not enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction, and a litigant’s request for declaratory relief does not
alter a suit’s underlying nature.[3] IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855; State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947
(Tex. 1994). It is well settled that “private parties cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity from
suit by characterizing a suit for money damages . . . as a declaratory-judgment claim.” IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d
at 856 (citing W. D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 308 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. 1958)).
City of El Paso v. Heinrich , No. 06-0778 (Tex. May 1, 2009)(Jefferson)
( governmental immunity )(retrospective monetary relief barred; prospective relief against official capacity
defendant not barred by immunity, no individual-capacity claims, ergo official immunity inapplicable )

For claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes, however, the Declaratory Judgment Act
requires that the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and thereby waives immunity. Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006(b) (“In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or
franchise, the municipality must be made a party and is entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance,
or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state must also be served with a
copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard.”); see Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d
692, 697-698 (Tex. 2003) (“[I]f the Legislature requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit for which
immunity would otherwise attach, the Legislature has intentionally waived the State’s sovereign
immunity.”); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994) (“The DJA expressly
provides that persons may challenge ordinances or statutes, and that governmental entities must be
joined or notified. Governmental entities joined as parties may be bound by a court’s declaration on their
ordinances or statutes. The Act thus contemplates that governmental entities may be—indeed, must be—
joined in suits to construe their legislative pronouncements.”). Here, Heinrich is not challenging the validity
of the bylaws or the governing statute, but rather petitioners’ actions under them.

AIC Management v. Crews , No. 05-0270, 246 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008)(O’Neill) ( eminent domain,
condemnation , sufficiency of legal description, UDJA, jurisdiction of Harris County Civil Courts at Law)
Justice Willett filed a concurring opinion .


PETITIONS DENIED IN UDJA CASES FROM THE COURTS OF APPEALS

08-0838
FITZHUGH 25 PARTNERS, L.P. v. KILN SYNDICATE KLN 501, CHAUCER SYNDICATE RAS 1096, BRIT
SYNDICATE BRT 2987; from Dallas County; 5th district ( 05 - 07 - 01334 - CV , 261 SW3d 861, 08-20-08)
did not breach their contract of insurance coverage when they refused to pay Fitzhugh's claim for
replacement costs. We conclude the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the
Underwriters on Fitzhugh's claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract. We affirm the trial
court's judgment.